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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 17-2333 
____________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CARLOS WILTSHIRE, 
a/k/a Shawn Carter, a/k/a Shake 
 
 
Carlos Wiltshire, 
    Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 5-11-cr-00310-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 20, 2018 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 6, 2018) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Carlos Wiltshire appeals after he was resentenced in the wake of Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). He argues that his new sentence is substantively 
unreasonable. He also claims—for the first time on appeal—that the District Court should 
have vacated one of his convictions. Because neither claim is persuasive, we will affirm. 
I 
A 
 A jury found Wiltshire guilty of: (1) possessing crack cocaine with intent to 
distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1); and (3) possessing body armor as a felon previously convicted of a crime of 
violence, 18 U.S.C. § 931(a)(1). Because Wiltshire already had two New York 
convictions for attempted robbery and a Pennsylvania conviction for selling heroin, he 
was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.§ 924(e), and its 
corresponding United States Sentencing Guideline, § 4B1.4. Those two provisions apply 
to criminal defendants who have “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a 
serious drug offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and significantly enhance both the statutory 
minimum sentence and the Guidelines range applicable to felon-in-possession 
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  
 According to the law at the time Wiltshire was sentenced, his two convictions for 
attempted robbery under section 160.10 of the New York Penal Laws counted as “violent 
felonies” under ACCA’s so-called “residual clause,” because they “involve[d] conduct 
that present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” See 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). His Pennsylvania conviction for selling heroin, 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(30)—which counted as a “serious drug offense” under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—supplied the third predicate conviction that caused Wiltshire to be 
designated an armed career criminal.1 
 The ACCA enhancement increased Wiltshire’s offense level to 34 and his criminal 
history category to VI, resulting in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ 
imprisonment. The District Court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 276 months. 
Wiltshire appealed both his conviction and sentence and we affirmed the District Court’s 
judgment. United States v. Wiltshire, 568 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 After we decided Wiltshire’s first appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in Johnson that 
“[i]ncreasing a defendant’s sentence under the [residual] clause denies due process of 
law,” 135 S. Ct. at 2557. The Court subsequently held that Johnson applies retroactively 
to cases on collateral review, which afforded Wiltshire the opportunity to seek 
resentencing on the ground that he was unconstitutionally subjected to ACCA. See Welch 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). 
B 
 In light of Johnson, Wiltshire filed a motion to correct his sentence under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his two attempted robbery convictions no longer qualified as 
                                                 
1 Wiltshire was actually convicted on two separate charges for two different heroin 
sales, but they counted as only one predicate “conviction” for § 924(e) purposes because 
they were not “committed on occasions different from one another.” See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(1). 
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predicate “crimes of violence” under ACCA. The Government conceded the merits of the 
§ 2255 motion and joined Wiltshire’s request for a new sentencing hearing. 
 The Court granted Wiltshire’s motion, fixed his new Guidelines range at 110 to 
137 months’ imprisonment, and held a new sentencing hearing. The Government argued 
for a sentence like Wiltshire’s original 276-month commitment—a significant upward 
variance—to account for what it characterized as the seriousness of Wiltshire’s offense 
and criminal history, his refusal to take full responsibility for his criminal past, and his 
prior failures to comply with various conditions of supervision. For his part, Wiltshire 
argued that a below-Guidelines sentence of 84 months or less was warranted based on his 
conduct in prison since his original sentencing, his 16-year-old son’s interest in being 
able to see his father, the nonviolent nature of Wiltshire’s offense of conviction, his 
acceptance of responsibility, and the relatively low-level offenses that made up much of 
his criminal history. After considering the parties’ arguments and the sentencing factors 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court varied upward and sentenced Wiltshire to 180 
months’ imprisonment. Wiltshire timely appealed.2 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. See United 
States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 664 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that an order resentencing a 
§ 2255 petitioner is “part of the prisoner’s criminal case” for purposes of appellate 
jurisdiction, and is thus directly appealable under §§ 1291 and 3742 without the 
certificate of appealability that 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) requires in appeals from “final 
order[s] in . . . proceeding[s] under section 2255”). 
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II 
A 
 We review the sentence imposed by the District Court for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). We “focus 
on . . . the totality of the circumstances,” and there is no “presum[ption] that a sentence is 
[substantively] unreasonable simply because it falls outside the advisory Guidelines 
range.” Id. at 567 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50–51 (2007)). Reversal is 
appropriate only if “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. at 
568. 
 Under this exacting standard, we cannot agree that Wiltshire’s 180-month 
sentence was substantively unreasonable. Wiltshire first argues that where his “original 
sentence . . . was at the lower end of the [original] guideline range,” and there is no “new 
aggravating information to be considered in connection with resentencing,” the District 
Court’s upward variance could not have been justified. Wiltshire Br. 19–20. But as the 
Government points out, the District Court was under no obligation to mechanistically 
vary its sentence along with the Guidelines range, and the “disparity [between the two 
sentencing ranges] result[ed] from” a change in the law “entirely divorced from 
Wiltshire’s actual conduct and background.” Government Br. 30–31. Nor was it 
unreasonable for the District Court to conclude that without the ACCA enhancement, the 
Guidelines range no longer adequately reflected the seriousness of Wiltshire’s prior 
participation in two violent robberies, including one where he hit the victim in the head 
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with a bat. For those reasons, the Court did not abuse its discretion when it varied 
upward. 
 Wiltshire’s second argument is no more persuasive. He contends that the District 
Court erred by giving insufficient weight to his maturation since his first sentencing, his 
recent history of good conduct while incarcerated, and his commitment to his sons. The 
record shows that the District Court considered all of those points in Wiltshire’s favor, 
but concluded that they were outweighed by the seriousness of his offense, his criminal 
history, and the failure of past punishment to deter him. “[G]iv[ing] due deference to the 
district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justif[ied] the extent of the 
variance,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the imposition of a 
180-month sentence. 
B 
 For the first time on appeal, Wiltshire claims his conviction for possession of body 
armor under 18 U.S.C. § 931 should be vacated. Like his since-vacated ACCA 
enhancement, Wiltshire’s § 931 conviction depended on his New York robbery 
convictions qualifying as predicate “crime[s] of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 931(a)(1), under a 
definition that includes any “offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be 
used,” id. § 16(b). This Court has held that Johnson’s due-process analysis of ACCA 
applies equally to § 16(b), Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 621 (3d Cir. 2016), and 
Wiltshire argues that we must therefore vacate his § 931 conviction. 
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 Without expressing any opinion on the merits of Wiltshire’s claim, we cannot 
grant him that relief now for the reasons stated by the Government: 
Wiltshire did not challenge his Section 931 conviction in the 
direct appeal of his conviction . . . [or] in his Section 2255 
motion . . . . In granting Wiltshire’s Section 2255 motion, the 
district court merely vacated Wiltshire’s sentence and 
conducted a resentencing proceeding . . . . [Wiltshire] did not 
and could not challenge the conviction in the resentencing 
proceeding generated by that motion. Wiltshire’s current 
appeal is limited to th[at] resentencing, and the claim regarding 
the validity of his Section 931 conviction is beyond . . . [its] 
scope. 
Government Br. at 39–40. 
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
